Abstract. The paper provides a new (pre)kernel catcher in that the relevant set always contains the (pre)kernel. This new (pre)kernel catcher gives rise to a better lower bound 5.** such that the kernel is included in strong e-cores for all real numbers 5 not smaller than the relevant bound 5***.
Introduction
The solution part of cooperative game theory aims to solve the problem of how to allocate the overall profits of a joint enterprise to the participants. The various solution concepts prescribe somehow equitable divisions of the overall profits among the players in the game (which is the mathematical model of the joint enterprise). The core is considered to be one of the most important solution concepts for cooperative games. An allocation of the overall profits is said to belong to the core of a given game if no coalition (subset of players) has any incentive to object against the proposed allocation, that is the sum of all the allocations to the members of any coalition majorizes the worth of the coalition in the given game.
Unfortunately, core-allocations need not to exist. However, if a cost of e is imposed on the formation of any nontrivial coalition in the game, then the notion of coreallocations can be replaced by so-called strong e-core-allocations which are guaranteed to exist for large real numbers e.
Another widely used approach in cooperative game theory is the concept called prekernel. An allocation of the overall profits is said to belong to the prekernel of a given game if each pair of players is in equilibrium concerning their mutual threats arising from the proposed allocation. A threat of one player against another player with respect to an allocation is determined by the maximal gain that some coalition, containing one player but not the other, may achieve by withdrawing from the proposed allocation in favour of the worth of the coalition in the given game. It is known that prekernel allocations always exist. The kernel can be regarded as a generalized version of the prekernel.
The intersection of the prekernel and the core was thoroughly studied in the context of assignment games (cf. [9] ), bankruptcy games (cf. [1] ), as well as some network flow games (cf. [5] ).
Maschler, Peleg and Shapley (1979) established that the part of the (pre)kernel inside any strong e-core depends only on the latter's geometrical shape. That is, a strong e-core element belongs to the (pre)kernel if and only if it possesses the so-called bisection property, i.e., it is always the midpoint of a certain bargaining range between each two players where each endpoint of the bargaining range is in the boundary of the strong 5-core. By choosing the real number 5 large enough, the entire kernel is included in the strong 5-core and the above geometrical result can be regarded as a geometrical characterization of the entire kernel. Therefore it is worthwhile to provide lower bounds on 5 to guarantee that the kernel is included in strong 5-cores for all 5 not smaller than the relevant lower bound. Maschler et al. (1979) provided such a lower bound 5. on 5, but they were still interested in better lower bounds. Chang and Kan (1992) provided a better lower bound 5.. than 5.. The goal of this paper is to provide a better lower bound 5.** than e**. Our lower bound e*** on 5 arises from a new (pre)kernel catcher which can be interpreted as an improvement of the so-called reasonable set being the (pre)kernel catcher used by Maschler etal. (1979) .
Definitions and notions
This paper deals with cooperative games (N, v) in coalitional form where the player set N = {1, 2, ..., n}, n _ 3, and so-called characteristic function v: 2N~IR satisfies v (0) : = 0. Any non-empty subset of N is called a coalition. Usually, the cooperative game (N, v) is identified with its characteristic function v. For the sake of notation, we write x(S) instead of 52 x~ for any xs~", any SS2N\{0}, whereas x(0):= 0. ~s Let's recall several known notions and solution concepts. The sets of all pre-imputations and imputations respectively in the n-person game v are given by
The core of the game v and its interior are defined by
The excess of coalition S s 2 u with respect to the vector xslR" in the n-person game v is defined to be
e"(S,x):=v(S)-x(S)
whereas e~(0,x):=0. Obviously, if5 = 0, then the notion of strong e-core agrees with the core. The maximum surplus of player i over another player j with respect to the pre-imputation x in the game v is defined to be
si~(x) := max [e~ (S,x) l S s 2 ~, i e S, j qs-S] .
We say player i outweighs player j with respect to the imputation x e Y-(v)if both x~ > v ({j}) and s~] (x) > s~] (x). The kernel ~ (v) of the game v is defined as the set of all imputations for which no player outweighs another player. Besides, the prekernel of the game v is given by c(*(v) :--{xeY-*(v) ls,~(x) --s;~(x) for all i, jsN, i r Maschler etal. (1979) proved that the parts of the kernel and the prekernel inside the core always coincide. To be precise, :/{ (v)ca cg~(v) = ~* (v)ca ~ (v) for all e < 0. For a detailed treatment of all these notions and solution concepts, we refer to Driessen (1988, Chap. II). For any player i in the n-person game v, the notions of his largest contribution, his almost largest contribution and his almost smallest contribution, respectively, are defined to be
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is N, all x s ~(v). The set ~ (v) was studied by Kikuta (1976) , Funaki (1986) 
The goal of this paper is twofold. The first purpose is to provide a (pre)kernel catcher that is included in the reasonable set. In Sect. 3 it is established that the set ~(v)ucg~ is a (pre)kernel catcher. Evidently, (v) w cg0 (v) c 08 (v) because of cg0 (v) ccg (v) c 08 (v) as well as ~ (v) ~ 08 (v) which is due to the fact that ?y < r~ for all isN. The second purpose is to provide a lower bound 5*** on e such that the kernel is included in strong e-cores for all 5 > 5***. In Sect. 4 we present such a lower bound for a subclass of games by studying the chain of inclusions ~ (v) c (~ (v) ~ ~ (v)) w ~o (v) c cg~ (v).
A new (pre)kernel catcher
The next theorem states that any (pre-)imputation of the (pre)kernel belongs to the interior of the core or the set ~(v). Theorem 
Y (v) c ~ (v) w ego (v) and o,~ff * (v) c ~ (v) w cs (v) for any game v.
Proof. Let 
syi(x) > e"(T~{i},x) > e~(T,x) = S~k(X) > Sy,(X) > S~.,(X)
for all je T\{i}.
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That is, we arrive at a contradiction whenever T ~ {i}. It remains to consider the case T= {i}. Now we obtain that s~ (x) _< s~ (x) _< si~, (x) = e v ({i}, x) = v ({i}) -x~ < 0 for all jtX\{i}.
From s~(x) < 0 for alljtN\{i}, we deduce that v(S)-x(S) < 0 for all jtN\{i}, all S t 2 u with j ~ S, i q~ S.
This yields that v (S) -x (S) < 0 for all S e 2 u satisfying ir Sr 0. In addition, this result together with (3.1) implies that
v(S) -x(S) = e~(S,x) < e~ (S\{i},x) < 0 for all St2 N, itS, S ~ N, S ~ {i}.
Remark that also v({i})-x~ < 0. We conclude that v (S) < x (S) for all S e 2u\{0, N}. This, however, contradicts the assumption x r (go (v). In any case we arrive at a contradiction which completes the proof of the theo- 1, 1, -1), (1, -1, 1), (-1, 1, 1 
Notice that the set ~(v) may be empty, whereas the reasonable set r is always nonempty (without proof).
Kernel catchers in terms of strong ~-cores
This section is devoted to conditions on the real number e that guarantee that the strong e-core contains the kernel. The approach to include the kernel in some strong t-core is strongly based on Chang and Kan's result that, under certain circumstances, any imputation of the kernel belongs to the interior of the core or the set ~(v).
Theorem 4.1. (cf [2], page 90) Let v be a zero-normalized game (i.e., v ({i}) = O for all ie N) satisfying v (S) <_ v (N) for all S t 2 N. Then

Yf (v) ~ 2 ~ (v) ~ (go (v) .
In the final stage of their research on the kernel of such games, Chang and Kan (1992) provided some critical number e** (v) in such a way that the inclusions
hold for all E _> e** (v).
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See also Remark 4.4. Our final goal is to provide a better lower bound on e for such games that ensures that the strong e-core contains the kernel. The improvement of the lower bound on e will be obtained from the replacement of the reasonable set ~(v) by the new kernel catcher (v) u (go (v). That is, we examine the inclusion
In this context, we introduce for an arbitrarily zero-normalized game v the critical number e***(v) as follows. Write ~+ instead of max [0, ~] for any c~ t IR. 
I max min [v(S),v(S) -m~(S),v(S)
Sr
Proof. Let xt(2'(v)n~(v))u(g(v)
and St2Nk{0,N}.
If x t (g(v), then x (S) > v(S). If x E 2~ ~ (v), then x~ _> m~ for all ieN, so x(S)>m'(S) and moreover, x(S)>O since x i >_ v({i}) = 0 for all itN. If xt~(v), then x i _< ~ for all ie N, so x(S) = v(N) -x(NkS) >_ v(N) -~"(NkS).
In order to show that v(S) -x(S) < e for all e >_ e***(v), we distinguish three cases involving the sets (g(v), ~e(v) and ~(v). 
Case one. Suppose that (g(v)= 0. Then x~e(v)n~(v) implies x(S) > O, x(S) >_ mY(S) as well as x(S) > v(N) -?V(N\S). Hence x(S) > max [O, mV(S),v(N) --~"(N\S)] and consequently, v(S) -x(S) < min [v(S), v(S) -m~(S), v(S) -v(N)
+
